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When Federal Tax Law Frustrates Policy: The
Confused Rules Governing the Deductibility of
Captive Insurance Premiums
DEFINING CAPTIVE INSURANCE COMPANIES
A "captive" insurance company is owned by those whose risk
it insures.' Traditionally a captive insurance arrangement in-
volved a subsidiary that insured its parent.2 More recently, cap-
tives have been used to insure sibling and unrelated entities?
Under these arrangements, the term "captive" applies loosely
and, at some point, tends to become misleading.!
Entities that pay high premiums for coverage that is difficult
to obtain or those that engage in risk-intensive activities often
find it advantageous to form captives.5 There are numerous
legitimate business reasons for forming captives, including re-
duced cost, control over litigation and related services and access
to global reinsurance markets." Captives are usually designed
and administered by sophisticated and well respected insurance
experts.' The desire to form captives is primarily driven by the
goal of making a business more efficient and competitive.
The Internal Revenue Service (the "Service") has identified
1. Stuart R. Singer, When The Internal Revenue Service Abuses the System:
Captive Insurance Companies and the Delusion of the Economic Family, 10 VA. TAX
REV. 113, 117 (1990).
2. Armando Gomez, A Practical Approach to the Captive Insurance Problem:
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 46 TAx LAW. 619, 621 (1993).
3. Gomez, supra, note 2, at 622-23.
4. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 61, 90 (1991), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992). For example, when a subsidiary
was not formed for the purpose of insuring its parent and only 0.25% of its gross
premiums are derived from the parent, it hardly seems appropriate to call it
.captive" simply because it insures its parent's risk. Sears, 96 T.C. at 90.
5. Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 197, 200 (1987), affd in part, rev'd
in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir. 1989).
6. Singer, supra note 1, at 117.
7. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 951 (1985),
aff'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1986).
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three types of captive insurance companies.8 The first is a sub-
sidiary that directly insures its parent's or siblings' risks.9 The
second is a subsidiary that reinsures its parent's risk when the
risk has first been insured through an unrelated insurer." The
third is a subsidiary that insures its parent's or siblings' risk,
and subsequently passes the risk on to an unrelated reinsur-
er." Other combinations are also possible." The hallmark of
an insurance company raising the "captive" issue for federal
income tax purposes is that it insures related entities. 3
THE FEDERAL TAx ISSUE
Deductions are allowed under Internal Revenue Code section
162"' for premiums paid to insure against fire, storm, theft,
accident or other similar losses in the case of a business." The
obvious genesis of this deduction was to encourage companies to
maintain financial responsibility. However, funds reserved as
self-insurance set-asides or those held in trust to pay claims are
not considered "insurance premiums" and are not deductible."
Because taxpayers retain control over the funds, they must wait
until losses actually accrue and then deduct only amounts actu-
ally paid toward claims. Captive insurance premiums fall
somewhere between insurance and self-insurance. Thus, the
issue is whether payments to a captive insurance company are
deductible as insurance premiums or are not deductible as self-
insurance set-asides.
8. Rev. Rul. 77-316, 1977-2 C.B. 53.
9. Id.
10. Id. This practice is referred to as "fronting" a captive. BARRON'S DICTIO-
NARY OF INSURANCE TERMs 161 (2d ed. 1991).
11. Rev. Rule 77-316.
12. For example, a captive reinsurer may want to reinsure a portion of its
parent's risk with an unrelated reinsurer.
13. Singer, supra note 1, at 117.
14. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
15. Treas. Reg § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1993).
16. See Spring Canyon Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 43 F.2d 78, 80 (10th Cir.
1930), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 654 (1931); Anesthesia Serv. Medical Group, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 825 F.2d 241, 242 (9th Cir. 1987). In Spring Canyon Coal, the court
held that although insurance premiums are deductible as an ordinary and necessary
business expense, even an amount equal to what would have been paid in insurance
premiums is not deductible when it is set aside as a self-insurance reserve. Spring
Canyon Coal, 43 F.2d at 80. Only the amount actually paid in claims out of such a
fund is deductible. Id. In Anesthesia Serv. Medical Group, the court held that money
placed into an irrevocable trust and reserved to pay claims is not deductible even
where the fund is administered by third parties. Anesthesia Serv. Medical Group,
825 F.2d at 243.
17. Anesthesia Serv. Medical Group, 825 F.2d at 242.
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The root of the federal tax dilemma surrounding captives
stems from the fact that "insurance" is not defined by the Inter-
nal Revenue Code and is poorly defined by the courts."5 The
current definition used to determine whether payments to cap-
tives are deductible is derived from fifty year-old language in
Helvering v. LeGierse.9 In LeGierse, the United States Supreme
Court held that insurance historically required the existence of
"risk shifting and risk distribution.""
The modern judicial definition of insurance is only slightly
more comprehensive. It adds that a transaction must involve the
presence of an "insurance risk" and must be for "insurance in a
commonly accepted sense."2
Risk-shifting and risk distribution ard related concepts, both
growing out of the nature of an insurance relationship." De-
spite the Service's attempts to argue otherwise in some situa-
tions, it is difficult to conceive of one existing without the oth-
er.23 Risk-shifting requires the transfer of economic consequenc-
es of a loss away from the entity claiming the deduction.24 Risk
distribution requires the pooling of funds in order to spread the
economic consequences of claims over a group that is large
enough to yield predictable losses.2" When risk-shifting and risk
distribution are both present, the risk bearer theoretically as-
sumes less aggregate exposure than the sum of the individual
risks.2"
There have been two principal theories used to determine
whether premiums paid to a captive are deductible. Both theo-
ries use the language of risk-shifting and risk distribution. The
first is the "economic family" theory propounded by the Service.
18. Gomez, supra note 2, at 620.
19. 312 U.S. 531 (1941). LeGierse did not involve captive insurance. It involved
determining whether the proceeds paid under a "life insurance contract" were proper-
ly included in a decedent's gross estate. LeGierse, 312 U.S. at 537.
20. Id. at 539.
21. See Amerco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18, 38 (1991), affd, 979 F.2d
162 (9th Cir. 1992); The Harper Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 45, 58 (1991), aft'd,
979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 61,
100 (1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992).
22. Amerco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 979 F.2d 162, 165 (9th Cir. 1992).
23. Amerco, 979 F.2d at 165.
24. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 957 (1985), a/fd,
811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1987). In other words, the entity pays another to bear the
risk of its activities.
25. Sears, 96 T.C. at 101.
26. Id. This phenomenon is referred to as "the law of large numbers" and
occurs because the exposure created by a single insured in a pool can be spread to




This theory relies heavily on the concept of risk-shifting as di-
vorced from risk distribution. Under the economic family theory,
payments to a captive are per se not deductible because risk-
shifting can never occur when an insurer and an insured are
members of the same economic family. 7 From a federal income
tax perspective, this theory is fatally flawed because it unjustifi-
ably ignores the separateness of corporate entities for tax pur-
poses.28
The second theory employs a substance over form analysis
and recharacterizes premiums paid to captives as self-insurance.
This recharacterization approach has gained popularity in the
courts at the expense of the economic family theory. The
recharacterization theory rejects the notion of an economic fami-
ly and looks to the circumstances of a particular arrangement to
determine whether a captive is providing insurance or self-insur-
ance.29 In its modern formulation, the recharacterization theory
looks more to risk distribution than to risk-shifting, although it
maintains that one cannot be present without the other.3" This
development has been touted as enlightened."' Under the
recharacterization approach, premiums are deductible in two
types of arrangements: where premiums are paid by a corpora-
tion to a sibling captive insurer, and where premiums are paid
by a parent corporation to a captive subsidiary insurer which
underwrites a sufficient amount of unrelated risk.32
Much ink has been spilled over the deductibility issue, yet a
substantial number of legitimate transactions unjustifiably re-
main atrisk of economic ruin. Even the most liberal formulation
of the recharacterization approach is misguided because it fails
to place the concepts of risk-shifting and risk distribution in
their proper context or to define them satisfactorily. The result
has been a maze of convoluted and counterintuitive rules. Under
these rules, the mere manipulation of corporate structure can
magically transform nondeductible self-insurance into deductible
insurance premiums.3 Furthermore, determinations of deduct-
27. Rev. Rul. 77-316.
28. See Moline Properties v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 436, 439-40 (1943)
(holding that a corporate form may be disregarded for tax purposes only if it is a
sham).
29. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 1010, 1024 (1987), affd,
914 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990).
30. See, e.g., Amerco, 979 F.2d at 165.
31. See generally, Gomez, supra note 2, at 627-28.
32. See Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner, 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989);
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Commissioner, 972 F.2d 858, 863 (7th Cir. 1992).
33. See Humana, 881 F.2d at 255-56. Under the rule in Humana, premiums
are not deductible when paid by a parent to a subsidiary, but are deductible when
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ibility often necessitate complex calculations of whether a cap-
tive insures a sufficient amount of unrelated risk which can only
be understood by the most sophisticated statisticians.34
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW
The Service's Position
In Revenue Ruling 77-316, the Service officially took the posi-
tion that payments to an insurer that is owned by its insured
are per se not deductible." The Service announced that where
the risk bearer and the insured are related entities, there could
be no risk shifting because "one economic family" bore the "ulti-
mate economic burden of [the] loss."" The Service concluded
that all such arrangements were self-insurance and not deduct-
ible under section 162." The economic family concept yielded a
simple and mechanical test: if an entity bought insurance from a
related entity, the premiums are not deductible. Ironically,
even though the Service's official position uses the word "insur-
ance," it does not seek to discover whether the risk bearer is
engaged in the business of insurance."
In Revenue Ruling 78-338,40 the Service concluded that a
captive owned by thirty-one individual shareholders could
achieve risk shifting and distribution because the captive in-
sured a sufficient amount of unrelated risk.4 1 In General Coun-
sel Memorandum 38,13642 and Private Letter Ruling 81-11-
087,' the Service also indicated that if a sufficient percentage
of a captive's premiums were derived from unrelated parties, the
same result could be achieved."
paid by a sibling to a sibling. Id. The obvious result of this rule is that non-deduct-
ible premiums can be made deductible through the use of a holding company. Id.
34. See Paul J. Sax, Captive Insurance-How Much Unrelated Risk Is
Enough?, 78 J. TAX'N 180 (1993).
35. Rev. Rul. 77-316. The Service had first stated this position in Gen. Couns.
Mem. 35,340 (May 15, 1973). Gen. Couns Mem. 37,040, published shortly before Rev.
Rul. 77-316, also contains a statement of this position. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,040
(June 22, 1977).
36. Rev. Rule 77-316.
37. Id. The entity would have to wait until claims were paid and then deduct
that amount under I.R.C. § 165. Id.
38. Singer, supra note 1, at 143.
39. Id. at 120.
40. Rev. Rul. 78-338, 1978-2 C.B. 107.
41. Id.
42. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,136 (Oct. 12, 1979).
43. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-11-087 (Dec. 18, 1980).
44. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,136; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-11-087.
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In General Counsel Memorandum 39,247,'5 the Service re-
tracted General Counsel Memorandum 38,136. The Service at-
tempted to extend the economic family concept to captives that
insured unrelated entities.4' The Service argued that the per-
centage of unrelated risk did not affect risk-shifting, but merely
increased the chance of ruin from outside sources.4"
Parent And Subsidiary Cases
Courts generally agree with the Service's conclusion, but give
its reasoning mixed support in situations where a captive sub-
sidiary exclusively insures its parent.48 In the parent and sub-
sidiary context, the issue is whether the captive should be re-
garded as a separate entity when determining whether risk has
been shifted away from its parent.' Courts have consistently
rejected taxpayers' arguments that the separate status of cap-
tives should be respected as a matter of course."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in
Carnation Co. v. Commissioner,' was one of the first appellate
courts to consider the captive issue. Carnation involved a par-
ent-subsidiary captive relationship. 2 A parent corporation in-
sured its risk with a domestic insurer, which in turn reinsured
ninety percent of the risk with the insured's wholly-owned Ber-
muda subsidiary.5 As part of the reinsurance contract, the par-
ent agreed to maintain an ongoing obligation to capitalize the
captive.54 The court held that the transaction did not involve
either risk shifting or risk distribution.55 The court noted that
45. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,247 (June 27, 1984).
46. Rev. Rul. 88-72, 1988-2 C.B. 31.
47. See The Harper Group v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18, 56 (1991), affd, 979
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992). This reversal of the Service's position was articulated by
expert witness Dr. Irving Plotkin. The Harper Group, 96 T.C. at 56.
48. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 956 (1985),
affd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1986) (explicitly rejecting the economic family theory);
but see, e.g., Carnation Co. v. Commissioner, 640 F.2d 1010, 1013 (1981) (implicitly
approving of the economic family theory by citing Rev. Rul. 77-316).
49. Clougherty Packing, 84 T.C. at 957.
50. See, e.g., Clougherty Packing, 811 F.2d at 1307; Carnation, 640 F.2d at
1013.
51. 640 F.2d 1010 (1981).
52. Carnation, 640 F.2d at 1012.
53. Id. Under the agreement, the domestic carrier paid claims, but then was
reimbursed by the captive reinsurer. Id. In the vernacular of the industry, this prac-
tice is called "fronting." See supra note 10 and accompanying text for the definition
of "fronting."
54. Carnation, 640 F.2d at 1013.
55. Id. The Tax Court also held that the transaction did not involve risk shift-
ing or risk distribution. Carnation, 71 T.C. at 409-10.
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the facts of the case were identical to those presented in Reve-
nue Ruling 77-316, and implicitly approved of the economic
family theory as grounds for denying the deductibility of the
payments. 6
Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner5 7 involved an identi-
cal arrangement to the one in Carnation, except that the parent
did not undertake an obligation to either contribute additional
capital to the captive or to assure that it could meet its obliga-
tion under the reinsurance contract.58 The Tax Court specifi-
cally rejected the economic family argument and opted for an
analysis focusing on the substance of the transaction." The
court concluded that an absence of an obligation to contribute
additional capital to a captive did not change the fact that the
parent failed to shift risk away from itself.60 The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed this decision and shed much awaited
light on the application of risk shifting and risk distribution con-
cepts to captive insurance. According to the court of appeals, the
ownership of the captive's stock holds the key to risk shifting
because as claims are paid, the value of the captive's stock de-
creases."1 This causal relationship results in the risk of loss re-
maining with the parent.62 On the other hand, independence of
risk holds the key to risk distribution because risk distribution
occurs when a sufficiently large amount of independent risk is
pooled in order to accurately predict losses and match premium
receipts with loss expectations.6
Sibling Corporation Cases
The next development in the line of captive cases involved
sibling corporations. Some courts concluded that risk could be
shifted to sibling corporations when the risk bearer was finan-
56. Carnation, 640 F.2d at 1014. Ironically, the Tax Court had not rejected
the Service's economic family theory and based its denial of deductibility on the
simple conclusion that the premiums were not paid for insurance as defined in
Helvering v. LeGierse, 312 U.S. 531 (1941). Carnation, 71 T.C. at 409-10.
57. 84 T.C. 948 (1985), affd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1986).
58. Clougherty Packing, 84 T.C. at 951. Also, instead of being formed offshore,
the captive was incorporated under the Colorado Captive Insurance Company Act.
Id. at 949.
59. Id. at 956-57.
60. Id. at 958. The court tautologically reasoned that insurance premiums
represented the cost of risk shifting and the absence of risk shifting necessarily
meant that there was an absence of insurance premiums. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Clougherty Packing, 84 T.C. at 958.
1995
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cially independent. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Commissioner,' a
captive was formed to insure the risks of its parent and sib-
lings.' The captive's stock was owned jointly by its parent and
its siblings.6 However, only premiums paid by the parent were
at issue. 7 The Tenth Circuit held that under this arrangement,
the premiums paid by the parent failed to establish risk-shifting
and risk distribution. 8
In Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner,6s a wholly-owned captive
directly insured both its parent's and siblings' risks.7" The par-
ent made all premium payments, but filed a consolidated return
and charged the sibling subsidiaries the premium payments it
made on their behalf.7' Premiums were calculated by standard
industry practices and there was no agreement to assure the
captive's ability to meet its obligations beyond an initial capital
contribution.72 The Tax Court again declined to adopt the eco-
nomic family theory.73 The court extended the risk-shifting
analysis used in Carnation and Clougherty to premiums paid to
a sibling captive insurer." The Tax Court reasoned that failing
to extend Clougherty and Carnation would invite corporations to
circumvent the rule by changing their corporate structures."
The Sixth Circuit reversed the Tax Court on the sibling corpo-
ration issue in Humana, Inc. v. Commissioner." The court of
appeals held that it was bound to treat the siblings and captive
as separate entities for tax purposes.77 Because losses to the
captive could only affect stock owned entirely by the parent, the
court held that the siblings' risk shifted when premiums were
charged back to the subsidiaries.7" The court further held that
64. 797 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1986).
65. Beech Aircraft, 797 F.2d at 921.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 922-23.
69. 88 T.C. 197 (1987), affd in part, rev'd in part, 881 F.2d 247 (6th Cir.
1989).
70. Humana, 88 T.C. at 202.
71. Id. at 206.
72. Id. at 202-03.
73. Id. at 214.
74. Id. at 213.
75. Humana, 88 T.C. at 213. The court further refined the risk shifting analy-
sis by introducing a balance sheet immunization test. Id. at 212. Under this test, a
corporation has not shifted risk unless its balance sheet is immunized from potential
losses through payment of premiums. Id. The court glossed over the fact that losses
to the captive did not affect the balance sheets of its siblings. Id.
76. 881 F.2d 247, 257 (6th Cir. 1989).
77. Humana, 881 F.2d at 252 (citing Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 436 (1943)).
78. Id. at 255. The Sixth Circuit held that it was permissible to shift the risk
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the separateness of the entities should also be respected for risk
distribution purposes." The court found risk distribution to
exist because the consequences of a loss were spread over a
larger group than just those represented by the individual in-
sured and insurer.80
In Malone & Hyde,"1 the scheme of corporate ownership and
risk insured was identical to Humana.2 However, the captive
assumed its parent's and siblings' risk under a reinsurance
agreement with a domestic fronting company." The parent pre-
sented evidence that the premiums it paid on the siblings' behalf
were charged back to the siblings on a consolidated return. "
The Tax Court cited Humana and allowed deductions for the
premiums charged back to the subsidiaries.85
Unrelated Risk Cases
The most recent captive cases have involved the presence of
unrelated insureds. The issue in the unrelated risk cases is
whether the captive insures enough unrelated entities to achieve
risk shifting and risk distribution.8 In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner,7 the taxpayer formed a wholly-owned reinsurance
subsidiary.' Through prearrangement, the taxpayer, its affili-
ates and various related corporations purchased insurance from
standard carriers who in turn reinsured the risk with the cap-
tive by ceding the premiums collected from the taxpayer and its
affiliates to the captive.8" The adequacy of the captive's initial
capitalization was questionable, and the parent executed guar-
antees to protect the fronting carriers. 0 The captive also in-
sured unrelated parties.9' However, for the tax years in ques-
of loss to a captive away from related entities by means of corporate structure. Id.
The court further criticized the Tax Court for recharacterizing a transaction simply
because the taxpayer was benefitting from tax laws. Id.
79. Id. at 256.
80. Id.
81. T.C.M. 1993-585.
82. Malone & Hyde, T.C.M. 1993-585.
83. Id. The captive was formed under the laws of Bermuda. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., Amerco, Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 T.C. 18, 36 (1991), afld, 979
F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992).
87. 89 T.C. 1010 (1987), affd, 914 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1990).
88. Gulf Oil, 89 T.C. at 1013. The captive was incorporated in Bermuda and
licensed to write general insurance under Bermuda law. Id.
89. Id. at 1014. The taxpayer was self-insured up to various levels and used
the captive to obtain a layer of excess coverage. Id. at 1015.
90. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Commissioner, 914 F.2d 39, 412 (3d Cir. 1990).
91. Gulf Oil, 89 T.C. at 1019. In subsequent years, the captive became eligible
1995
Duquesne Law Review
tion, only two percent of the gross premiums written by the
captive was attributable to unrelated insureds.92 The court con-
sidered whether the presence of the unrelated risk allowed risk
transfer and risk distribution to occur. 3 The Tax Court recog-
nized that risk transfer and risk distribution would occur if the
premiums collected from related entities were not likely to cover
their anticipated losses.94 The court declined, without expert
testimony, to provide guidance as to how much unrelated risk
was necessary to achieve this result.9" However, the court held
that two percent was de minimis and could not produce risk
transfer and risk distribution.' "
The Third Circuit affirmed, refusing to consider the affiliates
and siblings as separate entities for the purpose of determining
whether risk-shifting and distribution had occurred. 7 The court
of appeals reasoned that the captive had failed to establish itself
as a separate entity for insurance purposes because it was un-
dercapitalized and its parent had an ongoing obligation to guar-
antee its ability to meet its reinsurance obligations.
The watershed in unrelated risk cases occurred in the Tax
Court trilogy of Amerco, Inc. v. Commissioner,99 The Harper
Group v. Commissioner,"° and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Com-
missioner."' These three cases involved insurers that under-
wrote approximately fifty, thirty, and ninety-nine percent unre-
lated risk, respectively."' The Tax Court held that a captive
insuring a "substantial" amount of unrelated risk could be con-
sidered a separate entity when determining whether risk dis-
tribution and risk-shifting had occurred.03 In all three cases,
to write "surplus lines" on a "non-admitted" basis in numerous states in the United
States. Id. at 1021. A non-admitted insurer is not licensed by a particular state to
sell or service insurance policies within that state. BARRON'S DICTIONARY OF INSUR-
ANCE TERMS 275 (2d ed. 1991). Surplus lines are specialized property or liability cov-
erage provided by non-admitted insurers in instances where that coverage is unavail-
able from insurers licensed by the state. Id. at 404. Within ten years, the captive
derived sixty-two percent of its gross premiums from unrelated insureds. Gulf Oil,
89 T.C. at 1019.
92. Gulf Oil, 89 T.C. at 1019.
93. Id. at 1025.
94. Id. at 1027.
95. Id. at 1027 n.14.
96. Id. at 1028.
97. Gulf Oil, 914 F.2d at 412.
98. Id.
99. 96 T.C. 18 (1991), affd, 979 F.2d 162 (9th Cir. 1992).
100. 96 T.C. 45 (1991), aftd, 979 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1992).
101. 96 T.C. 61 (1991), aff'd, 972 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1992).
102. Amerco, 96 T.C. at 29; The Harper Group, 96 T.C. at 59-60; Sears, 96 T.C.
at 63.
103. Amerco, 96 T.C. at 29; The Harper Group, 96 T.C. at 59-60; Sears, 96 T.C.
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the Tax Court held that the captive insured enough unrelated
risk to achieve risk distribution and risk-shifting, and that the
premiums paid were deductible.'"
Besides settling the unrelated risk issue, the Tax Court en-
grafted two additional factors onto the test for determining
whether a captive constituted insurance: the existence of insur-
ance risk and a contract for insurance in its commonly accepted
sense.' The court did not offer guidance as to the minimum
threshold of unrelated risk that a captive needed to insure. Fur-
thermore, the significance of the additional factors, apart from
risk-shifting and risk distribution, was poorly explained. In
Amerco, the court cited the captive's utilization of standard in-
dustry practices and the fact that it was not domiciled in a for-
eign jurisdiction as key factors guiding its decision."° Yet, the
fact that the captive in The Harper Group was incorporated
under the laws of Hong Kong did not seem to affect the court's
analysis."7 Given the lack of deference to the additional fac-
tors, it seems safe to assume that absent outright fraud, the ad-
ditional requirements of deductibility will be met.
Under the rule established by the trilogy, once a threshold
requirement of unrelated risk is achieved, the entire premium
paid to a captive is deductible. However, it is not clear why this
all or nothing approach to deductibility is required by the risk
shifting and risk distribution concepts as they have been articu-
lated. The rule is confusing because it remains open to the argu-
ment that only the percentage of the risk which is actually
transferred and distributed should be deductible.
RECHARACTERIZATION REVISITED
Future captive insurance cases are likely to be analyzed under
the recharacterization approach adopted by the courts and not
at 63.
104. Amerco, 96 T.C. at 42; The Harper Group, 96 T.C. at 60; Sears, 96 T.C. at
102.
105. Amerco, 96 T.C. at 38. The fact that the court used the term "insurance"
to define the type of risk and type of contract that needed to be involved is ironic
because it is the existence of insurance that is at issue in the first place. The Ninth
Circuit provided some guidance by explaining that insurance risk which could pro-
duce only loss should be distinguished from investment risk which could produce
loss or gain. Amerco, 979 F.2d at 162.
106. Amerco, 96 T.C. at 36-37.
107. In The Harper Group, the court cited the fact that the Commissioner could
not explain why certain types of insurance transactions would not be subject to
nondeductibility as grounds for rejecting the economic family argument. The Harper
Group, 96 T.C. at 49. Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that its approach
was subject to its own criticism.
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under the Service's economic family theory. However, both theo-
ries share the same basic premise that at some point captive
arrangements are not insurance. They differ in only where that
point lies. Future recharacterization of captive insurance premi-
ums as a non-insurance must be better justified. The require-
ments of risk-shifting and risk distribution, as they are current-
ly defined, are instructive, but should not continue to be treated
as talismans.
As early as 1989, in Gulf Oil, the Tax Court recognized that
risk transfer and risk distribution could theoretically occur in a
wholly owned subsidiary."8 Yet, the court failed to explain
why it disregarded this fact."9 Subsequent cases never ade-
quately explained when a transaction ceases to be "in substance"
self-insurance and "in substance" real insurance.
Despite exhaustive attempts to justify this position, the un-
derlying criticism has never been answered. Courts have never
explained why they are empowered to ignore the separate cor-
porate status of a captive and have failed to explain why other
types of insurance typically not questioned on the same basis
are not subject to recharacterization."'
Identifying Insurance
As stated above, none of the captive cases make an attempt to
examine whether an insurer is actually engaged in the business
of insurance. Risk-shifting and risk distribution may be concepts
of insurance theory, but unless they are used in their proper
context, they prove to be poor tests for determining whether a
transaction is consistent with common conceptions of insur-
ance.'
1 '
A more comprehensive definition of insurance recognizes the
significance of pooling, homogeneity, independence, and volume
of risk."2 All of these factors can be present in a large and di-
verse pool of risk, regardless of the source of that risk."3
108. Gulf Oil, 89 T.C. at 1024. The court explained that "[a]lthough technically,
transfer of risk may occur when a captive is involved that is a separate, viable
entity, financially capable of meeting its obligations, we simply declined to recognize
it as such when the arrangement was merely, in substance, the equivalent of a
reserve for losses or self insurance." Id.
109. Id. at 1024-26.
110. Id.
111. Singer, supra note 1, at 140.
112. Id.
113. For example, a large corporation that engaged in a wide variety of dis-
parate activities could produce a pool of risk sufficient to meet these criteria. It is
clear that the corporate structure would not affect the characteristics of the risk.
Vol. 34:105
Comments
The Consequences of Reliance on Recharacterization
Undue reliance on the concepts of risk-shifting and risk trans-
fer may provide ammunition for future attacks on commonly
accepted insurance transactions. Retrospectively rated insurance
polices are the premier insurance vehicle for sizable commercial
risks that do not either engage in self-insurance programs or
form captives."' Premiums paid under retrospectively rated
policies have traditionally been treated as deductible in total
under section 162."' Serious concern has been expressed over
the potential application of the definition of insurance developed
in the captive cases to retrospectively rated policies." 6
Under a retrospectively rated policy, an initial premium is set
and then adjusted, either throughout the coverage period or at
the end of the coverage period." 7 The premium fluctuation is
typically subject to maximum and minimum limits which are
related to the predictability of the risk."' Where the risk is dif-
ficult to predict, the adjustment factor is often set so high that
there is no realistic chance of loss occurring outside the potential
premium range."' It appears clear that at least the portion of
the premium that is within the range that is subject to adjust-
ment does not represent a shifted risk under the
recharacterization approach. 2
Mutual insurance companies present a problem similar to that
of captives insuring unrelated risks. A mutual insurance compa-
ny is owned by its insureds. If a mutual company insures
enough unrelated parties it would qualify for the analysis used
in Amerco, The Harper Group, and Sears. However, the transac-
tion again raises the all or nothing question. At least theoretical-
ly, the transaction could be viewed as part insurance and part
self-insurance.'
114. Donald A. Winslow, A Note on Retrospectively Rated Insurance and Federal
Income Taxation, 79 KY. L.J. 195, 197 (1990).
115. Winslow, supra note 114, at 197.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 198.
118. Id. at 199.
119. Id. at 218.
120. Winslow, supra note 114, at 218-19.
121. See Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 948, 968 (1985)
(Gerber, J., dissenting), afl'd, 811 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1986).
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TOWARD A REALISTIC ABUSE-BASED STANDARD
The assault on captive insurance companies is often justified
on the grounds that captive arrangements present an unaccept-
able source of potentially abusive, long-term tax avoidance.
Abuse occurs, according to the proponents of this theory, because
insurance companies are taxed at a lower effective rate than
non-insurance companies. 2 Insurance companies are also al-
lowed to deduct funds that have been reserved for the payment
of claims, even though the liability on those claims has not yet
accrued.2 3 Thus, it would be advantageous for an entity to pay
premiums to its captive, deduct that payment as a business
expense, and then mark those premiums as reserves inside the
captive, thus producing considerable delay in the accrual of tax
liability.'-4
The obvious deficiency in this argument is that the special
rules governing the taxation of insurance companies are part of
the Internal Revenue Code. 25 The worst criticism that can be
made of captives in this regard is that they offer a means by
which corporations can effectively plan their tax liabilities. To
extend the criticism further is to question the wisdom of special
rules for the taxation of all insurance companies.126
It is also worth noting that Congress identified and addressed
potential abuses associated with captives domiciled in foreign
jurisdictions when it enacted "Subchapter F."27 It is instruc-
tive to note that Congress has never sought to recharacterize
captives.
Special tax laws governing insurance companies exist because
Congress has recognized the unique tax status of insurance
companies." If a captive behaves like an insurance company,
it should not be cause for alarm that premiums paid to it are
taxed as such. The standard for deductibility of premiums
should focus on whether the captive is organized in a way that
enables it to pay claims in a responsible and customary manner.
Some of the important factors have been identified as maintain-
ing adequate financial reserves, following commonly accepted
122. See I.R.C. § 832 (1988). Insurance companies are taxed on earned premi-
ums rather than premiums collected. Id. See Sax, supra note 34.
123. Sax, supra note 34, at 180.
124. Singer, supra note 1, at 117.
125. See I.R.C. §§ 831-48 (1988). Part II of Subchapter L governs the taxation
of insurance companies other than life insurance companies. I.R.C. § 831.
126. Singer, supra note 1, at 161.
127. See I.R.C. §§ 951-57 (1988) (imputing dividends to U.S. shareholders of
offshore captives based on premium).
128. See I.R.C. §§ 801-48 (1988).
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management practices, adhering to corporate formalities, obtain-
ing appropriate licensing, and subjecting oneself to regulation.
If these factors are observed, premiums a captive collects should
be treated as insurance premiums for tax purposes, regardless of
their source. Deductions for insurance premiums are a means of
encouraging companies to remain financially responsible to in-
jured parties. Tax law should not frustrate this policy by punish-
ing companies simply because they have found creative and
efficient ways of observing this policy. If the appropriate safe-
guards are observed, there is simply no reason to recharacterize
the transaction. Yet, the rules governing deductibility of captive
insurance premiums roll along in the circuit courts with mysteri-
ous and frustrating inertia. This phenomenon is perhaps best
embodied by the remarks of Justice Anderson who wrote:
It is conceded and undisputed by all that the arrangement is not a sub-
terfuge, there is no illegality, and no intent to evade. In short, it looks
like insurance, feels like insurance, and smells like insurance, but under
the holding, it isn't!1
Joseph C. Safar
129. Clougherty Packing Co. v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d 1297, 1307 (9th Cir.
1986) (Anderson, J., concurring).
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